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Introduction 
The time frame for a final decision on the Cyprus problem is narrowing very rapidly. The 
latest peace plan proposed by the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, known as the 
Annan Plan, to solve the problem between the Greek Cypriot (G/Cs) and Turkish Cypriot 
(T/Cs) communities underwent the last refinements in February 2003 to bridge the gap 
between the two sides. Yet, despite intense domestic (especially in the Turkish north) and 
international pressures on the two sides to sign the agreement the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership rejected the proposal as being insufficient in meeting their demands.  Despite 
the apparent low in negotiations between the two sides, there is still an opportunity to 
revive the Annan Plan as the basis for negotiated settlement before Cyprus joins the 
European Union (EU) in 2004. The U.S., the E.U., and the U.N. have all given signals 
that they are willing to tackle the problem before Cyprus joins the EU in 2004.  Given the 
gravity of the present situation, we provide an expected utility analysis of the problem in 
an attempt to determine areas of mutual cooperation between the two sides that could 
resolve the apparent deadlock. 
 
A Brief Background to the Problem 
There have been many works in recent years that presented extensive background to the 
Cyprus problem (e.g., Anastasiou 2000, Attalides 1979, Doob 1986, Loizos 1979, 
Necatigil 1993, Tamkoc 1988, Theophylactou 1995, Yesilada and Sozen 2002).  It will 
suffice for the purposes of this paper to note that the problem has been going on since the 
civil war started in 1963 and culminated in the territorial division of the island in 1974 
when the Turkish troops landed on Cyprus following an Athens supported coup against 
the Greek Cypriot president Makarios.  Since then two sides have been meeting under the 
auspices of the U.N. and the U.S. to resolve their differences and to settle the problem 
once and for all.  However, all efforts have failed to solve the Cyprus problem.  It is 
against this background and the implications of EU membership of Cyprus that the recent 
Annan Plan provides a unique opportunity to tackle this problem again.   
 
It can be argued that ever before in the history of the Cyprus problem has there been so 
much effort and energy invested by political leaders, civil society and the international 
diplomatic community to forge a settlement. But equally important is the fact that never 
before has there been such a confluence of favorable conditions for arriving at a 
comprehensive settlement of this protracted problem.  For these reasons it is important 
for all concerned to be fully aware of the gravity of another failure in settling the Cyprus 
problem. The consequences of a failure will not only have a grave impact on Greek 
Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot (G/C-T/C) interests, but also on Greek-Turkish relations, on the 
region in general and on security interests of the Western Alliance at a critical time. If the 
two sides miss this historic opportunity for a settlement, it is highly probable that a series 
of events will follow that have profound policy implications for the U.S. and the rest of 
the Western world. These are: 
 
1. The UN will withdraw its peace-making efforts. 
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2. The division of Cyprus will become permanent.  Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) will 
continue on the EU membership road while the Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs) move 
closer to integration with Turkey. 
3. If both sides say “NO” to the plan, Cyprus’s EU membership may become 
doubtful. 
4. T/Cs and G/Cs will become permanently alienated from each other. 
5. Greek-Turkish relations will suffer a major setback and diminish the progress 
made in recent years. 
6. Turkey’s membership in the EU would become more difficult if not 
impossible. 
7. The ESDI-NATO relations may be strained. 
8. Finally, in this worst-case scenario, the prime losers will be those G/Cs and 
T/Cs who had spent their lives hoping for peace and reconciliation on their 
Island. 
 
On the other hand, an agreement by the two sides for settling the Cyprus problem entails 
enormous benefits that for the first time in the history of the Cyprus problem outweigh 
the entire relative “losses” that each side will incur in reaching the compromises required 
by the Annan Plan.  The gains emanating from an agreed settlement are: 
 
1. A united Cyprus will enter the EU, thus engrafting the G/C and T/C societies and 
their future development in a broader system of stability, security and well being, 
a dimension that was absent from all previous efforts at settling the Cyprus 
problem. 
2. The conflict-preventive and peace-building institutions and political culture of the 
EU will become instated in all of Cyprus as a determining factor in T/C-G/C 
relations and Greek-Turkish relations.   
3. The people of Cyprus will stand to benefit economically from EU membership.    
4. The new generation will be freed from the shackles and burden of a problem of 
the past that they had no part creating, but which was transferred on their 
shoulders by the previous generations.  The new generation will thus re-orient its 
energy outward, creating a new society with new possibilities and a future within 
the EU framework.   
5. Relations between Turkey and Greece will greatly improve, setting the basis for 
progress on other outstanding issues, such as those related to the Aegean.  
6. Turkey’s advancement toward the EU will be greatly enhanced and speeded up. 
7. Cyprus, and consequently Turkey, will provide the first much needed example of 
Muslim societies and states operating securely, freely and cooperatively within 
western, secular democratic institutions at local, national and regional levels.       
8. The EU framework will be extended and deepened in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region, bringing the EU conciliatory and stabilizing institutions and political 
culture at the doorstep of the troubled Middle East as envisioned in the Barcelona 
Declaration. 
9. T/Cs, G/Cs, Turkey and Greece will offer the world a success story in peace and 
reconciliation, at a time when the world is in dire need for hope. 
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The issues that seem to be at the heart of the problem are: the future political system of 
Cyprus, territorial adjustment, freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, freedom of 
property rights (in each other’s state), guarantorship, and Turkey’s EU membership 
prospects (as a potential tradeoff issue). 
 
Expected Utility Analysis 
In this analysis we use a game theoretic, bounded rationality model, called the 
Expected Utility model, to analyze the political debate in Cyprus within a domestic and 
international context. The model is concerned with explaining how policy positions of 
competing interests evolve over time.  It leads to predictions about policy outcomes and 
identifies strategic opportunities for altering them.  We refer the reader to Bueno de 
Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka (1985 and 1996); Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 
(1994); Kugler and Feng (1997); and Bueno de Mesquita (2002) for details on the 
mathematics behind this approach, and provide only a brief summary here.  
The Expected Utility model is based in part on Black’s (1958) median voter 
theorem and Banks’ (1990) theorem about the monotonicity between expectations and 
the escalation of political disputes.  The model predicts behavior as a consequence of 
rational desired outcomes of the parties and their strategic interactions, not as an 
extension of past behavior. This approach simulates the shifts in position of individual 
stakeholders over time in response to the pressure that occurs during bargaining. The 
model is driven by a game in which actors simultaneously make proposals and exert 
influence on one another.  They then evaluate options and build coalitions by shifting 
positions on the issue in question.  
The logical flow of the model assesses how decision makers evaluate whether or 
not they will challenge policy if their expected value for action is positive or negative. A 
stakeholder’s probability of success depends upon its ability to influence, as well as its 
anticipated chance of success at convincing others to support the position advocated. The 
utility for success is the policy gain the stakeholder receives by acting and changing the 
policy outcome more in line with their desired position. The probability of failure is 
related to the constellation of opposing stakeholders, while the utility of failure is based 
on the policy consequences from a failed policy challenge.  
Using this process, the model provides a complete mapping of the relationships 
and perceptions of each stakeholder vis-à-vis every other stakeholder. The policy 
proposals and the subsequent responses begin to give insights into the process, 
anticipating policy dynamics and outcomes. In some cases, there are individual 
stakeholders who can apply a veto to any settlement, despite forecasted agreement by 
other parties. This is not the case in this analysis. The model thus provides a forecast of 
the likely settlement of policy issues as a function of competition, confrontation, 
cooperation, and negotiation. Data for the issues analyzed with this approach come from 
experts on the particular topic addressed. 
The model depends entirely on the policy acumen of experts.1 In this sense it is a 
marriage of the old and the new. It takes four key types of information from experts: who 
                                                 
1 Expert information obtained from Harry Anastasiou, Ahmet Sozen, and Birol Yesilada based on three 
decade long research on the position of individual parties in the Cyprus problem including survey 
information in 1998-2003. 
 5
are the stakeholders that can influence the policy outcome, what policy position do they 
currently advocate, what is their relative potential influence over the process, and finally 
how important is the issue to the policymaker. The approach uses only these data and 
then provides specific advice that helps policy analysts understand which policy options 
are likely to be successful, the sequence and timing of interventions, the nature of 
interactions among stakeholders, and the types of coalitions that will form. 
Feder (1995) provides a systematic assessment of the performance of expert-
generated data with the Expected Utility model using a large number of cases. He finds 
that while experts may disagree with the predictions of the model, their data tend to vary 
only slightly and do not produce appreciable differences in the model forecasts. This 
congruence suggests that the results of the model are robust. 
Note that without a guideline for the long-term interests of a nation, many actions 
can initially be seen as optimal that produce detrimental results over time. Differentiating 
between successful and unsuccessful approaches is often only possible with the benefit of 
hindsight. The Expected Utility model allows policymakers and policy analysts to 
anticipate likely consequences ahead of time. 
 
Analysis of the Cyprus Problem 
We have chose seven issues that are crucial to the negotiations. Six of them are internal 
to the Cyprus problem.  They are:  future political system, guarantorship, freedom of 
movement, freedom of settlement, freedom of property rights, and territorial division.  
The external issue that we believe is critical for Turkey’s willingness to go an extra mile 
in settling the Cyprus problem is the status of this country’s candidacy in the EU.  
Among the internal issues, the political system ranges from a unitary model to two 
separate and independent states.  In between, one finds the 1960 consociational unitary 
model, federation, and confederation (each differentiated by weak and strong forms).  
The guarantorship refers to external powers guarantee of the future stability of the new 
Cyprus – similar to the way it was envisioned under the 1960 London and Zurich 
agreements.  Different ideas represent preferences of different actors.  The next three 
issues pertain to degree of freedoms associates with the EU’s freedoms – movement, 
settlement, and property rights.  Each ranges from no freedom to full freedom.  The final 
internal issue is how much territory will the Turkish side keep with the settlement. The 
present situation is 34 percent while some on the Greek side argue that the Turkish 
Cypriots are entitled to no more than 20 percent territory because the Turks made up only 
18 percent of the population of the island in 1960.  The Turkish EU candidacy presents a 
unique connection to the Cyprus problem because it is generally viewed that unless the 
latter is resolved Turkey will not be ale to join the Union (Yesilada 2002). At present, the 
E.U. will review Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria in December 
2004 and will decide if this country is ready to begin accession talks.  We view this issue 
(beginning accession talks and not outright membership) as a potential tradeoff in the 
Cyprus negotiation and will test its linkage to the other seven issues. 
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Issue 1:  Turkey’s E.U. Membership 
As explained above, we want to treat this issue as a potential tradeoff in the Cyprus 
problem. However, before that could be pursued, we need to determine if there is any 
way that the different actors could come together on a common position on Turkey’s 
future membership in the E.U.  If there is no convergence of views than the tradeoff is 
unlikely.  Table 1 presents the position of actors on this issue and Figure 1 presents the 
expected utility forecast. 
 
 
Table 1:  Measurement Scale for Turkey’s EU aspirations 
 
0 = Never         
25=Present situation (review in 2004)       
50=Give a DATE for accession talks to start simultaneously with settlement of the Cyprus problem 
75=Start accession talks simultaneously with settlement of the Cyprus problem   
100=Start accession talks now regardless of the Cyprus problem    
 
 
Figure 1: Forecast of the Turkish-E.U. Issue 
 
Forecast:  Round 1 = 75 
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The forecast shows that there is a convergence around the option of starting accession 
talks with Turkey simultaneously with settling the Cyprus problem.  The only main 
opponent of this view is the Greek Orthodox Church that supports the present plan – 
review Turkey in December 2004.   
 
Issue 2: Political System 
Data for the Cyprus problem are presented in Appendix 1-7 (actors and positions 
on issues 1-7).  Both Greek and the Greek Cypriot actors are dissatisfied with the political 
system as it is presently constructed.  These actors favor a shift in the form of Cypriot 
government, with the preferred outcome ranging from a return to a unitary nation on one 
extreme, to the more moderate desires for a consociational system or a strong bi-zonal 
federation.  Turkish and Turkish Cypriot actors, on the other hand, support a divided 
Cypriot political system, with preferences ranging from a partitioned state to a weak bi-
zonal federation.  Thus, on the surface it appears that there should be room for 
compromise by seeking some form of bi-zonal federation.  Table 2 outlines the scale of 
policy preferences held by competing actors over the governance of Cyprus.  Figure 2 
presents our forecast based on the EU analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Measurement Scale for the Future Political System for Cyprus 
0 = Unitary State 
25 = Consociational democracy 
40 = Strong Federation 
50 = Weak Federation 
70 = Confederation 
85 = Weak Confederation 
100 = Two States (Status Quo) 
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Figure 2: Outcome of the Political System 
 
Forecast: Round 1 = 60, Round 2 = 60, Round 3 = 60 
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The forecast of the political system is something in between a weak federation and 
confederation.  Although the Greek Cypriots and Greece oppose the idea, almost 
everyone, except the Church and the right-wingers in the TRNC and Turkey, converge 
around this position that is backed by the four major external powers (EU, US, UK, and 
UN).  It is quite similar to the proposals found in the Annan Plan. 
 
 
Issue 3:  The Guarantorship 
As the history of the talks show, the two sides differ significantly on this issue. While the 
Turkish Cypriots prefer the 1960 arrangement they are willing to consider other 
formulations as long as Turkey’s guarantorship, therefore security for the Turkish 
Cypriots, does not become watered down.  The Greeks on the other hand increasingly 
view the E.U. as the appropriate guarantor of security.  Table 3 and Figure 3 present 
relevant data and information on our forecast. 
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Table 3:  Guarantorship Issue and Different Options 
 
 
0 = No Guarantee  
10 = UN Guarantee 
20 = EU Guarantee 
50 = NATO Guarantee 
75 = Annan Plan  
100 = 1960 Arrangement 
 
 
Figure 3: Forecast of the Guarantorship Issue 
 
Forecast:   Round 1 = 75, Round 2 = 75, Round 3 = 20 
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It is important to note that if the settlement is reached during the first or second 
rounds, the outcome is the proposals found in the Annan Plan where both Greece and 
Turkey play important role in guarantorship.  However, as the bargaining moves into the 
third round, the forecast shows the E.U. guarantorship as the most likely outcome. 
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Issue 4:  Freedom of Movement 
Freedom of movement across borders is a fundamental right of E.U. citizens. While both 
communities in Cyprus favor membership in the E.U., the Turkish Cypriots were more 
concerned about their security under the conditions of total freedom of movement of 
individuals across borders.  However, recent opening of the borders by the TRNC 
government on April 23, 2003 proved that freedom of movement for Cypriots did not 
result in acts of violence. Rather, people seem to be having a great time enjoying this new 
acquired freedom to the total shock of their respective governments who expected acts of 
violence.  In our forecast the expected utility analysis predicted this outcome of total 
freedom of movement (see Table 4 and Figure 4). 
 
Table 4: Freedom of Movement Scale 
 
0 = No 
Freedom 
 
    100 = Full Freedom 
 
Forecast:  Round 1 = 100, Round 2 = 100, Round 3 = 100 
 
 
Figure 4: Expected Utility Analysis of Freedom of Movement 
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The forecast of total freedom of movement is sustained through three rounds of 
bargaining indicating strong consensus among the parties.  In fact, since the opening of 
the borders by the TRNC, Greek and Turkish Cypriots are enjoying free movement 
throughout the island. 
 
Issue 5:  Freedom of Settlement 
Freedom of settlement is another fundamental right of E.U. citizens.  However, given the 
history of the Cyprus problem it is unlikely that the Turkish Cypriots will be willing to 
accept this as part of the settlement. Rather, it is likely that there will be some restrictions 
on both communities in this area.  The Annan Plan recognized the sensitivity of this issue 
and provided limitations on how many people will be permitted to settle in the other 
side’s state (Annan Plan 2002).  The limit presented was up to 20 percent of the total 
population of each state over a period of time.  Table 5 and Figure 5 provide the data and 
our forecast on this issue. 
 
Table 5:  Freedom of Settlement Scale 
 
 
0 = No 
Freedom 
 
    100 = Full Freedom 
 
 
Forecast:  Round 1 = 20, Round 2 = 20, Round 3 = 20 
 
 
The result is consistent with the limitations found in the Annan Plan.  The outliers are the 
Turkish military and the Greek Orthodox Church.  Amongst these two actors the Turkish 
military maintains a consistent position of 10 percent limit to freedom of settlement.   
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Figure 5: Expected Utility Analysis of Freedom of Settlement 
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Issue 6:  Freedom of Property 
This topic is one of the most sensate issues in the Cyprus problem.  Following the 1974 
war, over 250,000 Greek Cypriots left their homes and took refuge in the south.  In return 
about 45,000 Turkish Cypriots left their homes and took refuge in the north.  Since then 
the problem of who is the rightful owner of the Greek homes in the TRNC has been a 
heated topic.  The problem is more complicated since tens of thousands of settlers from 
Turkey migrated to the TRNC and now reside in homes once owned by Greek Cypriots.  
Thus, we need to consider the ownership of what was left behind as well as the right of 
every Cypriot citizen to own property anywhere in the E.U., but in particular across the 
dividing line in Cyprus, in any property ownership agreement.  Table 6 and Figure 6 
provide preliminary results on this issue. 
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Table 6:  Freedom of Property Scale 
 
 
 
0 = No 
Freedom 
 
    100 = Full Freedom 
 
 
Forecast:  Round 1 = 30, Round 2 = 30, Round 3 = 30 
 
Once again the forecast shows restriction on the right to own property across the border if 
settlement is to be found. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Expected Utility Analysis of Freedom of Property 
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Issue 7:  Territorial Adjustment 
The Turkish Cypriots have always assumed that they will need to return some territory 
back to Greek Cypriot control in return for other concessions from the other side.  
However, how much has always been a tricky subject.  Over the years, at least three U.N. 
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sponsored plans proposed that the Turkish side keeps around 29 percent of total land.  
This means giving back 5-8 percent land to the Greek side.  The Annan plan also 
provided for this arrangement but the maps outlining the details received no favorable 
review from the Turkish Cypriot leadership.  Turkey also backed the Turkish Cypriots 
because the bulk of fresh water resources of the TRNC would be turned over to the Greek 
Cypriots.  The water issue is coupled with two other sensitive matters:  security and 
relocation of the Turkish Cypriots who will be asked to leave their homes.  Given the 
complexity of this matter, we anticipated a more complicated bargaining over territory.  
Table 7 and Figure 7 provide the issues scale and expected utility forecast of the subject. 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Territorial Adjustment Scale 
 
 
 
0 = 20% 
Turkish 
 
  
29.2% 
Turkish  
100 = 36% Turkish  
(Status Quo) 
 
 
Forecast:   
 
Round 1 = 29 
Round 2 = 27 
Round 3 = 30 
Round 4 = 24 
Round 5 = 23 
 
 
 
There is no clear outcome in this area. In the early rounds the bargaining seems to favor 
the Turkish Cypriot position. However, as negotiations proceed, the Greek Cypriots seem 
to gain the upper hand.  Without a more consistent outcome it is difficult to predict what 
will be the final compromise in a settlement. It will depend on which round of negotiating 
around other issues results in a peace agreement.  
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Figure 7: Expected Utility Analysis of Territorial Adjustment 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications  
The results of the study suggest that many of the key issues in the Cyprus problem can be 
solved around the Annan Plan.  Some issues are easier to solve than others. For example, 
freedom of movement is already expanding without any major difficulty.  We also see 
willingness among the actors to set limitations on the freedom of settlement and the 
freedom of property rights even though such restrictions seem, at least on the surface, to 
violate EU’s three freedoms.  Nevertheless, all of the main external actors favor the 
restrictions found in the Annan Plan.  Therefore, the issues are also ready for finalization.  
Our forecast for the future political system also suggests that the Annan Plan has the 
necessary foundation for a stable formula.  The two separate states can work together 
under a weak federal/confederal common state of Cyprus.  However, guarantorship and 
territorial adjustment are more difficult to resolve.  No stable outcome is possible unless 
some tradeoff can be worked out to bring the outliers into the median.  One such outlier 
with very strong influence in the Turkish camp is the military.  It consistently plays a 
hardliner position and, given its power and influence, can play the role of a spoiler.  Yet, 
Turkey needs a very strong signal from the E.U. that its efforts at reform and willingness 
to be part of the Union will be rewarded.  Increasing number of Turks believe that the 
E.U. candidacy is used as a ploy to acquire concessions from Turkey without giving her 
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the membership in the E.U.  Our analysis suggests a bold and risky policy 
recommendation that links solving the Cyprus problem to Turkey’s E.U. membership.  
The E.U. should start accession talks with Turkey simultaneously with resolution of the 
Cyprus problem. If this option is brought to the bargaining table, it is highly likely that 
the Turkish military and other hardliners will join the larger group of players in the 
median.  For future analysis, we will look at tradeoff between these three sensitive issues, 
territorial adjustment, guarantorship, and Turkey’s E.U. membership, to further 
investigate the problem. 
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APPENDIX: CYPRUS FORECASTS (MAY 2003) 
The list includes all major actors in the Greek (CG) and Turkish (CT) parts of Cyprus, 
Greece, and Turkey. In addition, other foreign actors with vested interest in the Cyprus 
problem are included. 
 
Participants and Resources 
 
Issue 1: Turkey's EU Membership  
0 = Never     
25=Present situation (review in 2004)   
50=Give a DATE for accession talks to start simultaneously with 
settlement of the Cyprus problem 
75=Start accession talks simultaneously with settlement of the Cyprus 
problem 
100=Start accession talks now regardless of the Cyprus problem 
     
     
     
Actor Weight Power Position Salience 
Cypriot Turks 5    
President Denktash   150 100 90
CTP   30 50 90
TKP   10 75 90
UBP-DP coalition   10 100 80
Business Turks   15 75 80
Unions - Teachers   15 75 85
Media Pro   10 50 60
Media Anti   10 100 85
Peace Activist   5 50 75
UHH   10 100 90
Public Opinion   10 75 80
Greek Cypriots 15    
President   100 75 75
Disi   15 75 80
Akel   40 75 80
Diko   50 50 80
Kisos   20 50 80
Other Parties   5 50 75
Business Greeks   15 75 70
Union Left   10 75 75
Union Right   5 50 75
CYBC   15 50 75
ANTENA   5 50 80
ERT   10 50 65
MEGA   5 50 80
SIGMA   10 50 90
Public Opinion   20 50 75
Church   20 25 80
 18
Greece 45    
Prime Minister   100 75 80
Opposition Parties   30 50 80
ERT   15 50 65
MEGA   10 25 60
ANTENA   10 25 60
Church   20 25 60
Business   30 75 75
Public Opinion   30 50 60
Foreign Actors 400    
US   300 75 90
EU   50 50 85
UK   25 75 85
UN   25 75 95
Turkey 70    
Public Opinion   20 75 75
Opposition Parties   20 75 80
President   15 100 90
Military   100 100 90
Prime Minister   30 75 80
Media Pro   10 75 80
Media Anti   10 100 90
Business Pro   20 75 80
Business Islamic   5 75 85
 
 
 
Forecast Issue 1:  Turkey’s EU Membership 
 
EU Membership    
Stakeholder Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Denktash CT 100 100 100 
CTP CT 50 50 50 
TKP CT 75 75 75 
UBP-DP Coalition CT 100 100 100 
Business Turks CT 75 75 75 
Unions Teachers CT 75 75 75 
Media Pro CT 50 75 87 
Media Anti CT 100 100 100 
Peace Activist CT 50 50 75 
UHH CT 100 100 100 
Public CT 75 75 75 
President CG 75 75 75 
Disi CG 75 75 75 
Akel CG 75 75 75 
Diko CG 50 50 75 
Kisos CG 50 50 75 
Other Parties CG 50 50 75 
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Business Greeks CG 75 75 75 
Union Left CG 75 75 75 
Union Right CG 50 50 75 
CYBC CG 50 50 75 
ANTENA CG 50 50 75 
ERT CG 50 75 75 
MEGA CG 50 50 75 
SIGMA CG 50 50 50 
Public CG 50 50 75 
Church CG 25 25 26 
Prime Minister G 75 75 75 
Opposition G 50 50 75 
ERT G 50 75 75 
MEGA G 25 25 26 
ANTENA G 25 25 26 
Church G 25 26 26 
Business G 75 75 75 
Public G 50 75 81 
US 75 75 75 
EU 50 50 75 
UK 75 75 75 
UN 75 75 75 
Public T 75 75 75 
Opposition T 75 75 75 
President T 100 100 100 
MilitaryT 100 100 100 
Prime Minister T 75 75 75 
Media Pro T 75 75 75 
Media Anti T 100 100 100 
Business Pro T 75 75 75 
Business Islamic T 75 75 75 
    
Forecast 75 75 75 
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Issue 2: Political System Type Position Scale 
0 = Unitary State     
25 = Consociational Democracy   
40 = Strong Federation    
50 = Weak Federation    
70 = Confederation    
85 = Weak Confederation    
100 = Two States (Status Quo)    
     
Actor Weight Power Position Salience 
Cypriot Turks 5    
President Denktash   150 100 90
CTP   30 40 70
TKP   10 50 70
UBP-DP coalition   10 85 70
Business Turks   15 50 60
Unions - Teachers   15 50 60
Media Pro   10 70 80
Media Anti   10 100 90
Peace Activist   5 50 60
UHH   10 100 95
Public Opinion   10 70 80
Greek Cypriots 15    
President   100 40 85
Disi   15 50 80
Akel   40 50 85
Diko   50 40 95
Kisos   20 40 95
Other Parties   5 40 70
Business Greeks   15 50 75
Union Left   10 50 80
Union Right   5 40 80
CYBC   15 40 65
ANTENA   5 40 80
ERT   10 40 60
MEGA   5 40 80
SIGMA   10 40 90
Public Opinion   20 40 70
Church   20 25 85
Greece 45    
Prime Minister   100 50 90
Opposition Parties   30 40 70
ERT   15 40 60
MEGA   10 40 70
ANTENA   10 40 70
Church   20 25 80
Business   30 50 60
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Public Opinion   30 40 55
Foreign Actors 400    
US   300 60 90
EU   50 60 90
UK   25 60 90
UN   25 60 95
Turkey 70    
Public Opinion   20 80 60
Opposition Parties   20 85 70
President   15 85 80
Military   100 85 85
Prime Minister   30 70 60
Media Pro   10 60 60
Media Anti   10 90 90
Business Pro   20 60 60
Business Islamic   5 70 60
 
 
 
Forecast Issue 2 
 
Political System Type    
Stakeholder Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Denktash CT 100 90 90 
CTP CT 40 42 45 
TKP CT 50 60 60 
UBP-DP Coalition CT 85 85 42 
Business Turks CT 50 53 56 
Unions Teachers CT 50 53 56 
Media Pro CT 70 60 61 
Media  Anti CT 100 91 91 
Peace Activist CT 50 53 56 
UHH CT 100 91 91 
Public CT 70 60 61 
President CG 40 41 60 
Disi CG 50 60 61 
Akel CG 50 60 61 
Diko CG 40 41 60 
Kisos CG 40 42 60 
Other Parties CG 40 40 59 
Business Greeks CG 50 60 60 
Union Left CG 50 60 61 
Union Right CG 40 40 60 
CYBC CG 40 41 50 
ANTENA CG 40 40 60 
ERT CG 40 40 41 
MEGA CG 40 40 60 
SIGMA CG 40 42 60 
 22
Public CG 40 41 45 
Church CG 25 25 27 
Prime Minister G 50 60 60 
Opposition G 40 41 42 
ERT G 40 41 42 
MEGA G 40 41 48 
ANTENA G 40 41 48 
Church G 25 25 27 
Business G 50 60 60 
Public G 40 41 42 
US 60 60 60 
EU 60 60 60 
UK 60 60 60 
UN 60 60 60 
Public T 80 60 60 
Opposition T 85 85 40 
President T 85 85 85 
MilitaryT 85 85 85 
Prime Minister T 70 60 60 
Media Pro T 60 63 60 
Media Anti T 90 86 86 
Business Pro T 60 61 60 
Business Islamic T 70 60 60 
    
Forecast 60 60 60 
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Issue 3: Guarantorship Position Scale  
0 = No Guarantee     
10 = UN Guarantee    
20 = EU Guarantee    
50 = NATO Guarantee    
75 = Annan Plan     
100 = 1960 Arrangement    
     
Actor Weight Power Position Salience
Cypriot Turks 5    
President Denktash   150 100 90
CTP   30 75 60
TKP   10 75 70
UBP-DP coalition   10 100 85
Business Turks   15 75 75
Unions - Teachers   15 75 80
Media Pro   10 75 80
Media Anti   10 100 95
Peace Activist   5 75 90
UHH   10 100 100
Public Opinion   10 75 85
Greek Cypriots 15    
President   100 75 75
Disi   15 75 85
Akel   40 75 85
Diko   50 20 90
Kisos   20 20 90
Other Parties   5 20 75
Business Greeks   15 20 70
Union Left   10 75 75
Union Right   5 20 85
CYBC   15 20 80
ANTENA   5 20 85
ERT   10 20 70
MEGA   5 20 85
SIGMA   10 20 90
Public Opinion   20 20 70
Church   20 20 95
Greece 45    
Prime Minister   100 75 95
Opposition Parties   30 20 75
ERT   15 20 70
MEGA   10 20 75
ANTENA   10 20 75
Church   20 20 90
Business   30 20 65
Public Opinion   30 20 65
Foreign Actors 400    
 24
US   300 75 90
EU   50 75 90
UK   25 75 90
UN   25 75 95
Turkey 70    
Public Opinion   20 90 60
Opposition Parties   20 95 80
President   15 95 80
Military   100 95 90
Prime Minister   30 80 60
Media Pro   10 75 60
Media Anti   10 95 95
Business Pro   20 80 60
Business Islamic   5 85 60
 
 
Forecast Issue 3 
 
Guarantorship    
Stakeholder Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Denktash CT 100 75 20 
CTP CT 75 75 75 
TKP CT 75 76 75 
UBP-DP Coalition CT 100 75 75 
Business Turks CT 75 80 75 
Unions Teachers CT 75 20 20 
Media Pro CT 75 20 20 
Media  Anti CT 100 75 75 
Peace Activist CT 75 20 20 
UHH CT 100 75 75 
Public CT 75 20 20 
President CG 75 20 20 
Disi CG 75 20 20 
Akel CG 75 20 20 
Diko CG 20 20 20 
Kisos CG 20 20 20 
Other Parties CG 20 20 20 
Business Greeks CG 20 20 20 
Union Left CG 75 80 75 
Union Right CG 20 20 20 
CYBC CG 20 20 20 
ANTENA CG 20 20 20 
ERT CG 20 20 20 
MEGA CG 20 20 20 
SIGMA CG 20 20 20 
Public CG 20 20 20 
Church CG 20 20 20 
Prime Minister G 75 75 20 
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Opposition G 20 20 20 
ERT G 20 20 20 
MEGA G 20 20 20 
ANTENA G 20 20 20 
Church G 20 20 20 
Business G 20 20 20 
Public G 20 20 20 
US 75 75 20 
EU 75 20 20 
UK 75 20 20 
UN 75 75 20 
Public T 90 75 95 
Opposition T 95 79 95 
President T 95 70 75 
MilitaryT 95 95 95 
Prime Minister T 80 84 83 
Media Pro T 75 75 75 
Media Anti T 95 95 95 
Business Pro T 80 84 81 
Business Islamic T 85 82 82 
    
Forecast 75 75 20 
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Issue 4:  Freedom of Movement Position Scale  
 
0 = No Freedom 
 
 100 = Full Freedom 
    
Actor Weight Power Position Salience
Cypriot Turks 5    
President Denktash   150 80 80
CTP   30 100 70
TKP   10 100 70
UBP-DP coalition   10 80 65
Business Turks   15 90 60
Unions - Teachers   15 100 80
Media Pro   10 95 60
Media Anti   10 70 90
Peace Activist   5 100 80
UHH   10 70 95
Public Opinion   10 85 60
Greek Cypriots 15    
President   100 100 95
Disi   15 100 95
Akel   40 100 95
Diko   50 100 95
Kisos   20 100 95
Other Parties   5 100 95
Business Greeks   15 100 95
Union Left   10 100 95
Union Right   5 100 95
CYBC   15 100 95
ANTENA   5 100 95
ERT   10 100 95
MEGA   5 100 95
SIGMA   10 100 95
Public Opinion   20 100 95
Church   20 100 95
Greece 45    
Prime Minister   100 100 95
Opposition Parties   30 100 95
ERT   15 100 95
MEGA   10 100 95
ANTENA   10 100 95
Church   20 100 95
Business   30 100 95
Public Opinion   30 100 95
Foreign Actors 400    
US   300 100 90
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EU   50 100 90
UK   25 100 90
UN   25 100 95
Turkey 70    
Public Opinion   20 80 60
Opposition Parties   20 80 80
President   15 85 80
Military   100 80 90
Prime Minister   30 90 60
Media Pro   10 90 50
Media Anti   10 70 85
Business Pro   20 90 60
Business Islamic   5 85 60
 
 
Forecast Issue 4:   
 
Freedom of Movement   
Stakeholder Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Denktash CT 80 100 100 
CTP CT 100 100 100 
TKP CT 100 100 100 
UBP-DP Coalition CT 80 100 100 
Business Turks CT 90 100 100 
Unions Teachers CT 100 100 100 
Media Pro CT 95 100 100 
Media  Anti CT 70 72 100 
Peace Activist CT 100 100 100 
UHH CT 70 72 100 
Public CT 85 100 100 
President CG 100 100 100 
Disi CG 100 100 100 
Akel CG 100 100 100 
Diko CG 100 100 100 
Kisos CG 100 100 100 
Other Parties CG 100 100 100 
Business Greeks CG 10 30 39 
Union Left CG 100 100 100 
Union Right CG 100 100 100 
CYBC CG 100 100 100 
ANTENA CG 100 100 100 
ERT CG 100 100 100 
MEGA CG 100 100 100 
SIGMA CG 100 100 100 
Public CG 100 100 100 
Church CG 100 100 100 
Prime Minister G 100 100 100 
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Opposition G 100 100 100 
ERT G 100 100 100 
MEGA G 100 100 100 
ANTENA G 100 100 100 
Church G 100 100 100 
Business G 100 100 100 
Public G 100 100 100 
US 100 100 100 
EU 100 100 100 
UK 100 100 100 
UN 100 100 100 
Public T 80 100 100 
Opposition T 80 100 100 
President T 85 100 100 
MilitaryT 80 80 100 
Prime Minister T 90 100 100 
Media Pro T 90 100 91 
Media Anti T 70 71 100 
Business Pro T 90 100 100 
Business Islamic T 85 100 100 
    
Forecast 100 100 100 
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                    Issue 5: Freedom of Settlement Position Scale 
 
0 = No Freedom 
 
 100 = Full Freedom 
    
Actor Weight Power Position Salience 
Cypriot Turks 5    
President Denktash   150 10 90
CTP   30 25 60
TKP   10 20 60
UBP-DP Coalition   10 10 80
Business Turks   15 15 60
Unions - Teachers   15 25 80
Media Pro   10 25 70
Media Anti   10 5 90
Peace Activist   5 30 80
UHH   10 10 95
Public Opinion   10 15 75
Greek Cypriots 15    
President   100 35 95
Disi   15 30 95
Akel   40 25 95
Diko   50 35 95
Kisos   20 35 95
Other Parties   5 35 80
Business Greeks   15 30 75
Union Left   10 25 80
Union Right   5 35 90
CYBC   15 30 80
ANTENA   5 35 85
ERT   10 25 70
MEGA   5 30 80
SIGMA   10 35 90
Public Opinion   20 30 85
Church   20 100 95
Greece 45    
Prime Minister   100 20 95
Opposition Parties   30 25 90
ERT   15 20 80
MEGA   10 25 85
ANTENA   10 25 85
Church   20 35 85
Business   30 20 75
Public Opinion   30 25 70
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Foreign Actors 400    
US   300 20 85
EU   50 30 90
UK   25 20 85
UN   25 20 95
Turkey 70    
Public Opinion   20 10 70
Opposition Parties   20 10 80
President   15 15 70
Military   100 10 90
Prime Minister   30 20 60
Media Pro   10 25 60
Media Anti   10 10 90
Business Pro   20 25 60
Business Islamic   5 20 60
 
 
Forecast Issue 5 
 
Freedom of Settlement   
Stakeholder Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Denktash CT 10 20 20 
CTP CT 25 25 23 
TKP CT 20 19 20 
UBP-DP Coalition CT 10 20 20 
Business Turks CT 15 16 14 
Unions Teachers CT 25 24 23 
Media Pro CT 25 24 23 
Media  Anti CT 5 8 10 
Peace Activist CT 30 30 29 
UHH CT 10 20 20 
Public CT 15 16 14 
President CG 35 35 33 
Disi CG 25 24 22 
Akel CG 35 34 32 
Diko CG 35 34 32 
Kisos CG 35 33 32 
Other Parties CG 35 33 32 
Business Greeks CG 30 29 29 
Union Left CG 25 24 23 
Union Right CG 35 33 32 
CYBC CG 30 29 29 
ANTENA CG 35 33 32 
ERT CG 25 25 23 
MEGA CG 30 30 29 
SIGMA CG 35 33 32 
Public CG 30 29 29 
Church CG 100 84 73 
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Prime Minister G 20 20 20 
Opposition G 25 20 20 
ERT G 20 10 20 
MEGA G 25 20 20 
ANTENA G 25 20 20 
Church G 35 34 33 
Business G 20 10 20 
Public G 25 20 10 
US 20 20 20 
EU 30 20 20 
UK 20 20 20 
UN 20 20 20 
Public T 10 20 10 
Opposition T 10 20 20 
President T 15 14 20 
MilitaryT 10 10 10 
Prime Minister T 20 25 20 
Media Pro T 25 20 10 
Media Anti T 10 20 20 
Business Pro T 25 20 10 
Business Islamic T 20 20 20 
    
Forecast 20 20 20 
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Issue 6: Freedom of Property Rights Position Scale 
 
0 = No Freedom 
 
 100 = Full Freedom  
    
Actor Weight Power Position Salience 
Cypriot Turks 5    
President Denktash   150 10 90
CTP   30 25 60
TKP   10 30 70
UBP-DP coalition   10 15 90
Business Turks   15 20 60
Unions - Teachers   15 25 80
Media Pro   10 25 60
Media Anti   10 10 90
Peace Activist   5 25 60
UHH   10 10 95
Public Opinion   10 15 70
Greek Cypriots 15    
President   100 40 75
Disi   15 35 75
Akel   40 30 80
Diko   50 40 90
Kisos   20 40 85
Other Parties   5 30 70
Business Greeks   15 35 75
Union Left   10 30 75
Union Right   5 40 75
CYBC   15 30 70
ANTENA   5 35 75
ERT   10 30 60
MEGA   5 35 70
SIGMA   10 40 90
Public Opinion   20 30 75
Church   20 100 90
Greece 45    
Prime Minister   100 25 90
Opposition Parties   30 30 80
ERT   15 30 60
MEGA   10 35 60
ANTENA   10 35 60
Church   20 40 65
Business   30 30 75
Public Opinion   30 35 85
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Foreign Actors 400    
US   300 30 85
EU   50 40 80
UK   25 30 80
UN   25 30 90
Turkey 70    
Public Opinion   20 10 60
Opposition Parties   20 10 80
President   15 10 90
Military   100 10 90
Prime Minister   30 20 60
Media Pro   10 25 60
Media Anti   10 10 90
Business Pro   20 30 60
Business Islamic   5 15 60
 
 
Forecast Issue 6 
 
Freedom of Property Rights   
Stakeholder Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Denktash CT 10 25 30 
CTP CT 25 25 23 
TKP CT 30 26 30 
UBP-DP Coalition CT 15 24 30 
Business Turks CT 20 20 20 
Unions Teachers CT 25 30 25 
Media Pro CT 25 24 23 
Media  Anti CT 10 25 30 
Peace Activist CT 25 24 23 
UHH CT 10 25 30 
Public CT 15 19 19 
President CG 40 35 34 
Disi CG 35 34 32 
Akel CG 30 25 30 
Diko CG 40 32 32 
Kisos CG 40 40 40 
Other Parties CG 30 26 30 
Business Greeks CG 35 34 32 
Union Left CG 30 25 30 
Union Right CG 40 40 39 
CYBC CG 30 27 30 
ANTENA CG 35 33 32 
ERT CG 30 29 30 
MEGA CG 35 33 32 
SIGMA CG 40 40 39 
Public CG 30 25 30 
Church CG 100 97 91 
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Prime Minister G 25 30 30 
Opposition G 30 25 30 
ERT G 30 30 30 
MEGA G 35 34 34 
ANTENA G 35 34 34 
Church G 40 35 34 
Business G 30 25 30 
Public G 35 30 30 
US 30 30 30 
EU 40 30 30 
UK 30 25 30 
UN 30 25 30 
Public T 10 25 24 
Opposition T 10 25 30 
President T 10 25 30 
MilitaryT 10 10 30 
Prime Minister T 20 30 24 
Media Pro T 25 23 22 
Media Anti T 10 25 30 
Business Pro T 30 30 30 
Business Islamic T 15 17 17 
    
Forecast 30 30 30 
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                     Issue 7:  Territoral Boundaries Position Scale  
 
0 = 20% Turkish 
 
        29.2% Turkish 
100 = 36% Turkish (Status 
Quo) 
      
Actor Weight Power Position Salience  
Cypriot Turks 5     
President Denktash   150 32 85 
CTP   30 29.2 60 
TKP   10 29.2 65 
UBP-DP coalition   10 32 75 
Business Turks   15 29.2 65 
Unions - Teachers   15 29.2 60  
Media Pro   10 29.2 60 
Media Anti   10 34 85 
Peace Activist   5 29.2 50 
UHH   10 34 85 
Public Opinion   10 30 70 
Greek Cypriots 15     
President   100 20 75 
Disi   15 23 70 
Akel   40 24 70 
Diko   50 20 80 
Kisos   20 20 80 
Other Parties   5 22 72 
Business Greeks   15 24 70 
Union Left   10 24 70 
Union Right   5 23 70 
CYBC   15 23 70 
ANTENA   5 22 77 
ERT   10 23 70 
MEGA   5 22 77 
SIGMA   10 20 80 
Public Opinion   20 20-23 75 
Church   20 20 85 
Greece 45     
Prime Minister   100 27 73 
Opposition Parties   30 25 75 
ERT   15 23 70 
MEGA   10 22 77 
ANTENA   10 22 77 
Church   20 20 85 
Business   30 27 50 
Public Opinion   30 23 70 
 36
Foreign Actors 400     
US   300 28.5 10 
EU   50 29.2 20 
UK   25 29.2 20 
UN   25 29.2 60 
Turkey 70     
Public Opinion   20 31 70 
Opposition Parties   20 30 75 
President   15 30 70 
Military   100 30 85 
Prime Minister   30 30 65 
Media Pro   10 29.2 60 
Media Anti   10 32 80 
Business Pro   20 29.2 50 
Business Islamic   5 30 60 
 
 
 
Forecast Issue 7 
 
Territorial Boundaries      
Stakeholder Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
Denktash CT 32 32 32 32 32 30 
CTP CT 29 30 20 20 24 24 
TKP CT 29 30 20 20 23 24 
UBP-DP Coalition CT 32 32 32 31 31 30 
Business Turks CT 29 30 20 20 23 24 
Unions Teachers CT 29 30 20 20 24 24 
Media Pro CT 29 30 21 21 24 24 
Media  Anti CT 34 34 34 34 33 33 
Peace Activist CT 29 30 30 29 29 26 
UHH CT 34 34 34 34 33 33 
Public CT 30 20 20 20 20 20 
President CG 20 20 20 20 21 22 
Disi CG 23 23 32 23 24 23 
Akel CG 24 24 24 24 23 23 
Diko CG 20 20 20 20 21 21 
Kisos CG 20 20 20 20 22 22 
Other Parties CG 22 22 22 22 24 23 
Business Greeks CG 24 24 24 24 23 23 
Union Left CG 24 24 24 24 23 23 
Union Right CG 23 23 32 23 24 23 
CYBC CG 23 23 32 23 24 23 
ANTENA CG 22 22 22 22 24 23 
ERT CG 23 23 32 23 24 23 
MEGA CG 23 23 23 23 24 23 
SIGMA CG 22 22 22 22 24 23 
Public CG 22 22 22 22 24 23 
 37
Church CG 20 20 20 20 23 23 
Prime Minister G 27 27 30 23 23 23 
Opposition G 25 25 25 25 24 23 
ERT G 23 23 30 23 24 23 
MEGA G 22 22 22 22 24 23 
ANTENA G 22 22 22 22 24 23 
Church G 20 20 20 20 23 23 
Business G 27 30 24 25 27 26 
Public G 23 23 30 23 24 23 
US 29 29 28 28 28 28 
EU 29 29 29 29 29 29 
UK 29 29 29 29 29 29 
UN 29 29 20 20 24 24 
Public T 31 31 31 31 25 23 
Opposition T 30 20 20 20 23 23 
President T 30 20 20 20 23 23 
MilitaryT 30 30 30 24 23 23 
Prime Minister T 30 27 30 26 24 23 
Media Pro T 29 29 20 20 24 24 
Media Anti T 32 32 32 32 32 31 
Business Pro T 29 29 29 30 27 26 
Business Islamic T 30 27 30 30 25 25 
       
Forecast 29 27 30 24 23 23 
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